Private Enterprise, Public Trust: The State of Corporate America After Sarbanes-Oxley by unknown

ii
Private Enterprise, Public Trust: The State of Corporate America  
After Sarbanes-Oxley
Includes bibliographic references
ISBN: 0-87186-150-X
First printing in bound-book form: 2006
Printed in the United States of America
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
2000 L Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C., 20036
(202)-296-5860
www.ced.org
iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 1
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 7
  The Central Role of the Corporation ........................................................................................................ 8
  What is the Agenda? ................................................................................................................................... 9
II. HOW SHOULD THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE CORPORATION BE  
 REPORTED TO THE PUBLIC?  THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION ...............11
  The Role of Audit Committees ...............................................................................................................11
  The Judgmental Nature of Financial Information .................................................................................12
  Recommendations .....................................................................................................................................15
  The Issue of Litigation ..............................................................................................................................16
III. WHAT IS THE PUBLIC COMPANY’S REPRESENTATTION TO THE PUBLIC?   
 SECTION 404 AND THE NATURE OF INTERNAL CONTROLS ................................................19
  The Value of Section 404 .........................................................................................................................19
  The Costs of Compliance .........................................................................................................................20
  CED’s Recommendations ........................................................................................................................21
IV. HOW SHOULD MANAGERS BE PAID?  THE PROBLEM OF  
 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ...............................................................................................................23
  Recommendations .....................................................................................................................................24
V. HOW SHOULD CORPORATE BOARDS BE SELECTED?  THE ISSUE OF  
 SHAREHOLDER VOTING .........................................................................................................................27
  The Characteristics of a Sound Board of Directors ..............................................................................27
  Recent Proposals to Change the Nomination and Election Process ...................................................28
  Reform of the Board’s Nomination Process: A Better Way to Construct a Board ...........................30
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................33
APPENDIX: PRESENTATION BY PATRICK M. GROSS AT STANFORD GRADUATE  
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROGRAM, JUNE 3, 2005 ........................35
ENDNOTES ................................................................................................................................................................43
MEMORANDA OF COMMENT, RESERVATION, OR DISSENT ............................................................45
Table of Contents
iv
The Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-proﬁt, 
non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady economic growth 
at high employment and reasonably stable prices, 
increased productivity and living standards, greater 
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and an 
improved quality of life for all. 
All CED policy recommendations must have the ap-
proval of trustees on the Research and Policy Commit-
tee. This committee is directed under the bylaws, which 
emphasize that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each instance is to 
be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not 
from that of any special political or economic group.” 
The committee is aided by a Research Advisory Board 
of leading social scientists and by a small permanent 
professional staﬀ. 
The Research and Policy Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending speciﬁc legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives. 
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. The research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the ﬁeld under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee participates in 
the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the trust-
ees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve or 
disapprove a policy statement, and they share with  
the Research and Policy Committee the privilege of 
submitting individual comments for publication.
The recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee 
and the responsible subcommittee. They are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staﬀ members, or others 
associated with CED. 
Responsibility For CED Statements On National Policy
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Purpose of This Statement
Revelations of misconduct in some of America’s leading 
corporations in recent years have seriously undermined 
conﬁdence in U.S. businesses and in business leaders.  
The Committee for Economic Development (CED), 
composed largely of business leaders, seeks to improve 
the system of corporate governance and to restore 
public conﬁdence in business.  Putting businesses on a 
sound ethical footing and restoring public trust in them 
are critically important to our economy and society.
As CED was beginning to consider the many 
issues raised by the corporate scandals, government 
oﬃcials – industry regulators, the Congress, and 
the administration – were fashioning new rules for 
public companies and their auditors to live by, mostly 
embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
related regulations.  But the new government-imposed 
rules, though beneﬁcial on balance and deserving of 
time to become fully eﬀective, are not suﬃcient, in our 
view.  In this report, CED recommends additional 
practical and eﬀective changes – in ﬁnancial statements, 
executive compensation, selection of corporate 
boards, and other matters – that do not require new 
government mandates.  We believe that these changes 
in institutions and behavior will yield higher corporate 
ethics and eﬀectiveness, and renewed public trust.
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1The highly visible accounting scandals that surrounded 
the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and several other 
major companies together with the revelation of fraud 
and other acts of malfeasance by corporate executives 
have aroused public outrage, called into question the 
values and ethics of business leaders, and undermined 
the public’s conﬁdence in public companies.  
CED, as a public-policy organization in which current 
and retired business leaders play a prominent role, is 
concerned about the reality, as well as the appearance, 
of corporate impropriety.  We are unwavering advocates 
for the free market system, but we are just as ﬁrm 
in our belief that businesses and their leaders must 
earn the public’s trust.  Perceptions that ﬁrms ﬂout 
rules, behave unethically, and use deceptive business 
processes weakens conﬁdence in, and support for, the 
free enterprise system.  Executive compensation that is 
untethered to economic value and violates perceptions 
of fairness leads to mistrust and the prospect of a 
stiﬂing regulatory backlash.  The ethical failing of a 
small number of corporate leaders is infectious: it 
undermines the ethical standards of their own ﬁrms 
and aﬀects the behavior of others and, therefore, must 
be cured.
This policy statement addresses governmental and 
corporate policies that aﬀect the behavior of publicly 
traded companies, as well as the conﬁdence of investors 
in them.  Many of the problems we address, and 
their solutions, are intangible, though their eﬀects are 
tangibly felt by investors, employees, and society at large. 
We acknowledge at the outset that no laws or policies 
will ever be suﬃcient to end all corporate misbehavior.  
We are conﬁdent, however, that truly independent and 
Executive Summary
inquisitive boards of directors will provide the best 
safeguard against corporate wrongdoing.  
We observe and conclude the following:
(1) Audit Committees Must be Autonomous 
and Vigorous 
Because shareholders know only what corporate 
management elects to tell them about the corporation, 
a substantial body of law, practice and regulation has 
been created to govern the scope and substance of 
reporting about a corporation’s ﬁnancial condition.  
Some key questions underlie this body of law and 
regulation: (1) What kinds of information should 
be provided to investors? (2) How should that 
information be presented to be clear to a typical 
investor? (3) What system will most readily produce 
such information?
Although the primary responsibility to answer these 
questions is with management, investors depend 
on corporate boards of directors, who, as agents for 
shareholders, must oversee the presentation of relevant 
information.  To do so, boards must have access to 
all pertinent data, and this will occur only if a board’s 
audit committee is competent, independent, and 
establishes eﬀective control over both the internal 
auditors and the independent outside auditors. 
In CED’s view, the relationship between the audit 
committee of the board and the outside and internal 
auditors is crucial.  The audit committee should exercise 
the same tone of control over the internal auditor as it 
does over the external auditor, extending to decisions of 
hiring, ﬁring, and compensation.  
2(2) Financial Information is Inherently 
Judgmental
There is debate over whether the audit process should 
be governed by speciﬁc rules or general principles, but 
CED believes that this dichotomy is largely a false 
choice: any rules have principles, and any principles 
have rules. 
Financial statements would be more useful if they 
were governed by fewer rules and displayed more of 
the judgment that lies behind estimated numbers. To a 
signiﬁcant degree the misdeeds of the 1990s, and their 
unfortunate consequences, arose from the false belief 
that ﬁnancial reports provide a precise measurement 
of corporate performance.  Some corporate managers 
used unreasonable estimates or assumptions or relied 
upon unique interpretations of accounting standards to 
present a ﬁctional ﬁnancial picture of their companies.  
But “proﬁts” or “revenues” or “value” are not like 
“temperature” or “mass” – they cannot be measured 
with precision.  Their estimation requires judgment.  
The tendency to focus excessively on precise but 
potentially misleading accounting has been called “the 
brittle illusion of accounting exactitude.” 
CED believes that stock analysts, the investing 
public, and regulators must recognize the inherently 
judgmental character of accounting statements and 
ﬁnancial information.  Ranges of values rather than 
precise numbers should be explained and understood 
as such.  In addition, ﬁnancial statements should be 
supplemented with non-ﬁnancial indicators of value. 
It will take time, and the cooperation of regulators, 
issuers, and analysts, to develop a modern ﬁnancial 
statement.  Such an admittedly inexact statement will 
require managers, directors, and auditors to exercise 
considerably more judgment than is common today.  
Audit committees in particular will have to clearly 
understand the judgments that have been made and 
take responsibility for assuring investors that the 
condition of the company is accurately represented 
by ﬁnancial statements.  CED recognizes that such 
judgments are not likely unless those making the 
judgments are protected from unwarranted challenges 
from private, third-party litigation (as distinguished 
from regulatory action).
(3) Give Sarbanes-Oxley a Chance to Work
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
requires public companies to make an annual 
assessment of the eﬀectiveness of their internal controls 
over ﬁnancial reporting.  And, each corporation’s 
independent auditors are required to audit and report 
on management’s assessment.
This requirement has become the center of a growing 
debate.  To the detractors, Section 404 is a cost burden 
with little real return – some call it a “compliance tax” 
on public companies.  However, we believe that Section 
404 provides an opportunity to redesign the external 
audit to make it a far more valuable management tool 
than it has been.  A growing number of companies 
and auditors report that the new requirement for an 
examination of internal controls yields beneﬁts both 
in greater ﬁnancial information and in improved 
understanding of a wide range of functions in the ﬁrm.  
The ﬁrst-year costs of complying with Section 
404 have been signiﬁcantly higher than initially 
anticipated.  However, we do not believe that Sarbanes-
Oxley requires legislative changes; we concur with 
the predominant view of experts that costs can be 
substantially reduced in future years.  CED sees room to 
tailor the requirements imposed by Section 404 within 
the existing statute, and endorses the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) implementation 
guidance based on their evaluation of the ﬁrst-year 
experience.  The guidance, issued simultaneously by the 
two agencies in May 2005, should lower the costs and 
increase the value of Section 404 compliance.
While CED believes that the implementation of the 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 will 
provide a substantial net beneﬁt for American busi-
nesses in general, we also acknowledge that the ongoing 
costs of compliance and certiﬁcation will be relatively 
higher for small and mid-sized companies.  CED does 
not recommend a broad exemption to Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirements for small-capitalization companies but 
nevertheless supports the objective of mitigating the 
costs to smaller companies. That objective is being  
examined by the PCAOB and SEC, as they reconsider 
3the process through which ongoing compliance and  
certiﬁcation is achieved. 
(4) Excessive Executive Compensation 
Can be Tamed by the Compensation 
Committee
Over the past 20 years, the average pay of top corporate 
managers has risen dramatically, and in our view 
too often unjustiﬁably. That is true both in absolute 
terms and in comparison to the wages of the average 
corporate employee.
In CED’s view, this disparity of income between top 
corporate executives and average employees is a cause 
for serious concern.  CED continues to believe that 
compensation should be determined by the market 
and must reﬂect the productivity of the individual in 
question.  We are fundamentally opposed to speciﬁc 
rules, laws, or regulations that place artiﬁcial limits on 
compensation, or that prohibit boards from making 
compensation decisions based on the performance of 
the individuals involved, fairly appraised.  But we are 
concerned that the diﬀerentials that exist today too 
often reﬂect neither market conditions nor individual 
performance.  Our view is that the process for 
determining executive compensation has been broken 
at far too many of our larger corporations, and that the 
solution to excessive executive compensation must be 
regarded as a matter of process and disclosure.  At the 
center of the process sits the compensation committee.
Our recommendations are as follows:  
• Compensation committees should adopt 
measurable, speciﬁc, and genuinely challenging 
goals (ﬁnancial, strategic, operational, and 
social) for the performance of their businesses, 
and judge management by them.  
• The compensation process must be run 
by compensation committees composed of 
independent directors.  And, compensation 
consultants, when used, must be entirely 
independent of management.  In selecting 
consultants, committees must comprehend 
how the process of ﬁxing top management 
compensation has broken down.  Whether 
or not consultants are used, the compensation 
committee should have direct authority over all 
terms of any management contract, including 
all forms of compensation.  
• Management should have a substantial equity 
interest in their company.  This interest should 
be over and above equity derived through 
options or grants.  Barring exceptional 
circumstances, management should act as “buy 
and hold” investors.
• Management should make a full, timely, and 
transparent disclosure of its compensation to 
shareholders.  The compensation discussion 
should be presented in one place in the 
company’s disclosure and should include all 
forms of compensation.  Disclosures should 
be comprehensive and easily understandable, 
and they should make clear how top oﬃcers 
would be compensated under plausible 
retirement or change-of-control situations.  
As this statement goes to press, the SEC is 
considering new disclosure rules for executive 
compensation that appear to carry out CED’s 
recommendations.  
• Choices of forms of compensation should 
promote the long-term value of the ﬁrm, 
rather than exploit favorable accounting or 
tax treatment.  We note that recent changes 
in accounting for stock options require that 
options be expensed on the accounting 
statements of public companies.  The expensing 
of options should neutralize a bias that 
has favored their use in recent years.  The 
compensation committee must also make clear 
the eﬀect of its compensation decisions on 
stockholder dilution.
• Severance compensation, like all other 
forms of executive compensation, should be 
reviewed carefully against criteria set by the 
compensation committee of the board, and the 
board should publicly provide full details of 
awards and explain publicly to shareholders the 
reasoning behind such awards.  
4• Companies should have the right to recapture 
top executive bonuses if ﬁnancial results by 
which they were justiﬁed turn out not to have 
been achieved when accounts are restated. 
(5)  Directors Must be Selected and 
Appraised by Independent Nominating 
Committees
A paradox of corporate stewardship is that, despite the 
principle that directors represent shareholders in the 
selection and retention of management, historically 
most directors have been selected by management. 
How should boards be assembled? What is the right 
way to select directors – and, therefore, to represent 
shareholders in their dealings with management? 
CED believes that reform of the nomination process 
can be eﬀected by board action; that sound practices 
can convert management selection of directors to a 
process eﬀectively independent of management control; 
and that directors, so chosen, will be more reliable 
representatives of the interests of shareholders.
An additional question is whether an eﬀective board 
needs leadership independent of the Chief Executive 
Oﬃcer.  CED believes that such independent leadership 
is essential, and that it can come from a non-executive 
chairman, the chairman of the board’s governance 
committee, or any other independent director who is 
designated as the lead director.  If a company has a lead 
director, he or she should not automatically rotate out 
of the position on a ﬁxed schedule.  CED, however, 
does not believe that one system ﬁts all.  
There have been important proposals to change the 
nomination and election process for directors.  Some 
of these proposals are worth serious consideration.  
However, CED does not, today, support proposals 
that would facilitate direct nomination of directors by 
shareholders.  Such proposals would allow leading 
groups of shareholders – generally, institutional funds 
that may have agendas inconsistent with the interests 
of shareholders at large – to exert undue and unequal 
power over boards, which would lead to conﬂicts 
within the board.  Also, it is almost impossible to 
imagine that a board assembled in one or more proxy 
ﬁghts could function constructively.  
A better alternative to allow direct shareholder 
inﬂuence over board membership would be to adopt 
a version of what is often referred to as the “majority 
vote” condition.  In principle, we support the view 
that an individual who does not have the support of a 
majority of voted shares should not be a director of a 
public company.  In practice, a majority-vote standard 
can take many forms.  As legal committees, regulators, 
and legislatures examine the pros and cons, we believe 
individual companies are in the best position to judge 
what version of a majority-vote standard is most 
suitable. 
In our view, the best approach to building high-quality 
boards is to assign to truly independent nominating 
committees the responsibility for recommending new 
board candidates and for evaluating the performance 
of existing board members.  The nominating committee 
should also have the responsibility of recommending 
committee assignments.  We recognize that the task 
of recruiting well-qualiﬁed directors may be diﬃcult.  
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
other reforms, the workload, time commitment, and 
responsibilities of independent directors have greatly 
increased.  Notwithstanding the beneﬁts from these 
reforms, it has become harder for public companies 
to ﬁnd well-qualiﬁed candidates willing to serve as 
directors.  
Large companies may resort to consultants to recruit 
for directors.  If so, the recruiters must report to the 
independent nominating committee and maintain 
independence from management.  But whether a 
company is large or small, and whether or not the 
board hires an outside recruiter, independent directors 
should begin the process of board selection by 
developing, without the participation of the CEO,  
a list of appropriate candidates.  CED believes that  
this approach provides a broad search pool, reaching 
talent that may not have been known to the CEO or 
the board.  
5Conclusion
Relations between corporations and investors have 
suﬀered wrenching change in the last ﬁve years, from 
both corporate misdeeds and the legislative reaction 
to them.  For all of the damage and pain, the potential 
exists for ultimate beneﬁt to all parties, as better and 
more transparent information breeds renewed investor 
conﬁdence and higher standards of behavior and 
openness.
In this statement, CED has recommended some 
changes in practice to hasten this beneﬁcial adjustment. 
However, we would view such proposed change as 
modest, and within the scope of the recent revisions 
in corporate governance practices.  CED believes that 
the wisest course now would be patience, to allow 
these new practices and institutions to be learned and 
understood, and to demonstrate their merit.
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7The recent collapse of Enron and WorldCom, and 
the revelations of accounting misstatements, fraud 
and other forms of malfeasance at other ﬁrms, have 
focused public attention and outrage on corporate 
behavior.  The conduct of some corporate executives 
and directors has called into question the values and 
ethics of business leaders and has undermined the 
public’s conﬁdence in public companies.  Continuing 
investigations and disclosures of unethical business 
practices have surely further damaged the public 
reputation of business.  According to a 2005 survey, 
only 2 percent of American investors regard CEOs 
of Fortune 500 companies as “very trustworthy.”  
Moreover, 80 percent of individuals surveyed 
indicated that large companies need to increase their 
transparency and oﬀer more information on their 
operations.1  
Publicly traded companies are essential to the success 
of both our free market economy and our democratic 
society.  But the willingness of citizens to invest in them 
and to continue their legal privileges is undermined 
by a loss of trust in corporations and the people who 
run them.  Financial scandals, burst bubbles, and the 
aggressive policies to prevent them have been part of 
capitalism’s history since the South Seas scandal of 
1720.  Scandals and other distortions usually have 
elicited political and regulatory reactions.  The 1933 
and 1934 Securities Acts were aimed at the corporate 
excesses of the 1920s.  The requirement that publicly 
traded ﬁrms have audit committees comprised only of 
non-management directors, and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, were directed at commercial 
bribery.  Now, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been 
directed at the accounting and governance outrages of 
the “Enron and WorldCom Era.”  Major aberrations in 
corporate behavior beget quantum responses, which 
inevitably have some rough edges.  Whatever their 
merits in the largest sense, there remains controversy 
over whether the beneﬁts to our economy and to 
investors justify the inevitable costs of regulatory 
change.
A debate is taking place over whether it is necessary 
to modify Sarbanes-Oxley.  CED sees the issue of the 
future of Sarbanes-Oxley in the larger context of the 
present and future state of corporate America: To what 
extent has the problem of interlinked weaknesses in 
accounting and governance been solved by Sarbanes-
Oxley?  What problems remain?  What has Sarbanes-
Oxley failed to address, and what has arisen out of the 
Act’s implementation?  And, most fundamentally, what 
needs to be done in order to give Americans conﬁdence 
that their business institutions are behaving ethically, 
responsibly and in ways consistent with sound and 
sustained long-term economic growth?
This policy statement addresses governmental and 
corporate policies that aﬀect the behavior of publicly 
traded companies, as well as the conﬁdence investors 
have in such companies.  Many of the problems we 
I. Introduction
“Great corporations exist only because they are created and safeguarded by our 
institutions, and it is therefore our right and our duty to see that they work in 
harmony with these institutions.” 
--- President Theodore Roosevelt, in his ﬁrst annual message 
to the Congress, 1901
8address, and their solutions, are intangible, though 
their eﬀects are tangibly felt by investors, employees, 
and society at large.  For the most part, we put our 
conﬁdence in the board of directors, in particular 
its independent members.  Truly independent and 
inquisitive boards are the best safeguard against 
corporate wrongdoing and the best means for 
promoting the economic interests of the company and 
its shareholders.
We acknowledge at the outset that no laws or policies 
will ever be suﬃcient to end all corporate misbehavior.  
Unfortunately, some detrimental activities will always 
be a part of every human system governed by laws and 
regulations.  But the recommendations of this report, 
if implemented, will go a long way towards curbing the 
excesses uncovered by recent scandals, and allowing 
the free-enterprise system to return to the task of 
producing valued goods and services for American and 
global customers on the one hand, while generating 
incomes for workers and shareholders on the other.* 
The Central Role of the Corporation
The links between corporate behavior and economic 
growth and performance have helped to determine the 
ground rules of American capitalism.  Anglo-American 
capitalism is distinct among capitalism’s global variants 
in its reliance on “public” sources of funding – stock – 
as opposed to “private” funding, such as direct holdings 
by banks or ﬁnancial families, as is generally the case 
in Japan, continental Europe, and in emerging market 
economies.   
This more open ﬁnancial system conveys important 
advantages.  By making the control of public 
corporations – and therefore most of society’s 
productive wealth – a contestable proposition, the 
system creates important checks and balances, as well 
as incentives, in the economy.  Corporate directors 
and managers must respond to changes around them 
quickly and adeptly or, in theory, be vulnerable to 
displacement.
This openness has at times been criticized.  In the 
1980s, for example, critics claimed that the U.S. 
economy was myopic, and that the churning that 
is characteristic of the U.S. stock market, and 
the resulting rapid turnover of shareholders, had 
shortened management’s time horizons to a dangerous 
degree.  By way of comparison, they pointed to the 
closely held ﬁnancing of the Japanese economy and 
argued that this gave the Japanese more room to 
plan and innovate.  A decade later, however, the two 
economies’ circumstances were reversed, and the 
open U.S. economy had proved more able to respond 
to the transformational imperatives of information 
technology.  And both systems – Japan in the 1980s 
and the United States in the 1990s – fell prey to 
equities bubbles, although the more open U.S. system 
was much better able to right itself, avoiding the 
decade-plus of stagnation that beset Japan.  To be sure, 
the U.S. system is not foolproof, but it does have the 
compelling advantage of putting pressure on directors 
and managers to adapt and innovate.
But the extent to which this model enjoys those 
advantages depends greatly on the extent to which 
the system solves the paradox of “the agency problem.”  
Economists long ago identiﬁed the separation of 
ownership and control in U.S. corporations.2  But 
at the heart of this separation lies a conundrum: 
shareholders invest in corporations and hire managers 
to run them, but shareholders cannot know as much 
about the condition of those corporations as the 
corporation’s management knows.  How, then, can 
shareholders assess the performance of their managers?  
A workable and eﬃcient corporate sector requires 
that the managers of corporations be led – by culture, 
incentive, and regulation – to act ethically and in the 
interest of shareholders, without self-dealing, and to 
provide the market with an adequate base of accurate, 
timely, and meaningful information.
This cannot be deemed an automatic, certain, or 
natural result.  Neither shareholders nor the public 
can rely on all corporate managers to provide accurate 
self-appraisal of their performance.  Instead, the nation 
has developed various rules and procedures to provide 
such appraisals.  The most prominent of these is the 
corporate board of directors.  The debate over the 
behavior and structure of boards – over corporate 
governance in general – goes to this “agency” question.  
Shareholders, theoretically, created boards of directors 
to act as their agents – to provide the assurance 
that corporations are being run by managers in 
the interests of their shareholders.  The directors, 
supposedly chosen by shareholders, were to retain 
* See Memorandum by Colette Mahoney (p.45).
9management, and replace management if necessary, 
in order to provide such assurance.  In fact, the reality 
is that in all companies of size, the management 
chooses the directors, subject to the formal approval 
of shareholders.  Whenever corporate scandals occur, 
serious questions are raised about the reliability of 
boards of directors.
The concern over corporate behavior and many of the 
other issues that have arisen alongside it (e.g., executive 
compensation, shareholder rights, or accounting 
misstatements) in the past several years should be 
considered in this frame – these issues all share the 
problem of deﬁning a role for boards of directors 
that leads them to align the incentives of managers 
and (current and prospective) shareholders.  Boards 
must have directors who are truly independent, but 
independent directors need not be adversarial.  A board 
needs to work with management towards common 
goals.  In sum, getting agency capitalism “right” 
means devising a system – one that includes ethical 
standards; government law, regulation and oversight; 
corporate governance practices; business processes and 
management culture – that makes boards eﬀective 
agents for shareholders, which in turn leads managers 
to work in shareholders’ interests.
What is the Agenda?
The regulatory system that governed corporate 
behavior before Sarbanes-Oxley was in many respects 
much improved from that of thirty years earlier.  
Boards for New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) 
companies have been required since 1976 to have 
audit committees comprised of non-management 
directors, and the independence standards for 
members have become more stringent since 1999.  
These independence requirements have provided a 
signiﬁcant improvement in corporate governance, 
although not to the extent intended.  In 1977, tougher 
auditing standards were established, and corporations 
were charged with maintaining new internal controls 
(though compliance and enforcement have been less 
than adequate).   Since those reforms, auditors have 
had the responsibility to report any questionable items.  
Outright corporate slush funds, once common, were 
substantially eliminated.
Without the changes instituted in the 1970s, the 
abuses of the past decade could have been far greater.  
Nonetheless, the breakdown that we have seen since 
the bursting of the technology bubble is egregious, 
because it represents a regression from widely shared 
standards of integrity and accountability, and because it 
has real economic consequences.  
CED, as a public-policy organization in which current 
and retired business leaders play a prominent role, is 
concerned about the reality, as well as the appearance, 
of corporate impropriety.  We are unwavering advocates 
for the free market system, but we are just as ﬁrm 
in our belief that businesses and their leaders must 
earn the public’s trust.  Perceptions that ﬁrms ﬂout 
rules, behave unethically, and use deceptive business 
processes weakens conﬁdence in, and support for, the 
free enterprise system.  Daily reports on the front pages 
of newspapers detailing malfeasance at large companies 
continue to sap public trust.  Instances of executive 
compensation that is untethered to economic value 
and violates perceptions of fairness lead to mistrust 
and the prospect of a stiﬂing regulatory backlash.  The 
ethical failing of a small number of corporate leaders 
is infectious: it undermines the ethical standards of 
their own ﬁrms and aﬀects the behavior of others and, 
therefore, must be cured. By their actions, the board 
of directors and the most senior corporate managers 
set the ethical tone of a corporation and develop and 
sustain its ethical culture.  Establishment of a culture 
of integrity is imperative if shareholder trust and, more 
broadly, public conﬁdence in the free market system are 
to be secured.
These were the concerns that gave rise to Sarbanes-
Oxley.  But how well has that new law functioned in 
these regards?  In this policy statement, CED addresses 
the state of corporate America after this landmark 
legislation.  Speciﬁcally, we have chosen to focus on the 
following four vital questions:
• First, how should the ﬁnancial condition of the 
corporation be reported to the public?  What 
kinds of ﬁnancial information, and other, 
non-ﬁnancial indicators of value, should be 
developed and made public, and what is the 
right process for doing so? 
• Second, how should publicly traded companies 
assure markets that the audit process is 
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independent and fair?  Has the controversial 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, relating to the 
eﬀectiveness of internal controls, gone too far, 
and if so, how should it be changed? 
• Third, how should the managers of corporations 
be compensated?  What is society’s interest in 
executive compensation, and what, if any, rules 
should govern it?
• Fourth, and ﬁnally, how should corporate 
boards be selected and led?   What are the 
characteristics of a “good” board?  What is the 
role of the lead member?  Should shareholders 
have more direct access to the nomination and 
selection process?  And, how should boards  
be constructed?
These questions are addressed in the chapters  
that follow.
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Because shareholders know only what corporate 
management elects to tell them about the corporation, 
a substantial body of law, practice and regulation has 
been created to govern the scope and substance of the 
ﬁnancial information corporations produce to describe 
their performance – to help shareholders to see the 
corporation “through the eyes of management.”  But the 
questions that underlie this body of law and regulation 
raise larger issues:  How should the public corporation 
represent its condition to the world?  How should 
investors comprehend a company’s ﬁnancial condition 
and its drivers of value?  The focus of this chapter is 
on the kinds of information that should be provided to 
investors, and what systems might best produce it.
Solutions begin with the role of corporate boards 
of directors.  As agents of the shareholders, they 
must oversee the presentation of information that 
describes the corporation’s ﬁnancial condition.  
Ideally, boards would see to it that eﬀective systems 
provide appropriate, accurate information about the 
performance, conditions, risks, and prospects of the 
corporation in a clear and comprehensible form.  Doing 
so raises two problems.  The ﬁrst is whether boards 
and management have the process, structure and 
incentive to provide this information.  The second is 
that characterizing the state of the corporation requires 
various judgments.  Reasonable people may diﬀer, 
leaving boards and management with the diﬃcult task 
of ensuring that the representation is fair.  
The Role of Audit Committees
Investors depend on corporate boards of directors to 
be responsible for the oversight and presentation of 
relevant information about the company.  To do so, 
boards must have access to all pertinent data. This 
requires an eﬀective, competent, and independent 
audit committee.  In practice, the audit committee 
must establish eﬀective control over both the internal 
auditors and the independent outside auditors.*  The 
roles of outside auditors are to verify the ﬁnancial 
statements and disclosures, to evaluate the process 
that produces them, and to highlight relevant risks 
and weaknesses.  Auditors must be independent of 
management and able to challenge management’s 
information.  
In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
persuaded the New York Stock Exchange to mandate 
that every company listed on the NYSE have an audit 
committee consisting solely of independent directors.  
(It also required that auditors report to the audit 
committee conditions discovered in their audit that 
struck them as suspicious, and required companies to 
have independent controllers.)  These requirements 
produced substantial improvement in corporate 
governance, but in most instances the audit committee 
did not take control of the audit. The external auditors 
selected to provide an independent view to the audit 
committee were usually hired by management, had 
their compensations determined by management, and 
solicited other consulting revenues from management.  
In addition, some audit ﬁrms lacked a process – or 
the will – to make sure that the audit partner for 
a particular client had no special ties or conﬂicts 
of interest.  The instance of Enron was an extreme 
example – the Arthur Andersen partner in charge 
II. How Should the Financial Condition of  
the Corporation Be Reported to the Public?  
The Nature of Financial Information
* This chapter emphasizes the role of the audit committee in 
corporate governance.  The ﬁnal chapter discusses the importance 
of the board as a whole, and its independent members and other 
committees.
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apparently allowed management to publish a manifestly 
unfair ﬁnancial statement.*  (This failure was abetted 
by a procedure, unique to Arthur Andersen, under 
which engagement partners were allowed to ignore 
opinions from their headquarters.)
Sarbanes-Oxley directly addressed these concerns.  It 
required that every audit committee member must be 
independent, and that the board must report whether 
at least one member is expert in ﬁnancial matters.  
Both of these criteria – independence and expertise 
– are hard to deﬁne, and regulators continue to struggle 
to ﬁnd the right deﬁnitions to put into practice.  But 
between the statutory requirement that these criteria 
be used, and pressure from the marketplace that they 
be used, we see ample evidence in our professional 
experiences that audit committees are becoming  
more eﬀective.
In CED’s view, the deﬁnition of who is a “ﬁnancial 
expert” is less important than the relationship between 
the audit committee of the board and the external and 
internal auditors.  The misrepresentations, abuses, 
and frauds revealed in the past several years did not 
occur primarily because of a lack of ﬁnancial expertise 
– Enron’s audit committee and its external auditors 
appeared to be well-qualiﬁed, but the audit committee 
did not take control of the process.  Every audit 
committee must take charge.
The relationship of the audit committee with the 
internal auditors, though not dictated by law, is also 
crucial.  The audit committee should exercise the same 
tone of control over the internal auditor as it does 
over the external auditor, extending to decisions of 
hiring, ﬁring, and the setting of compensation.  We 
believe the internal auditor must maintain a posture of 
operational independence.  This standard of objectivity 
should be such that both the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, which was 
created by the Sarbanes-Oxley law to regulate auditors 
of public companies) and the external auditor should 
be prepared to accept the work of the internal audit 
process if they are satisﬁed that it was independent  
and competent.
(Sarbanes-Oxley also required, in section 404, 
that companies’ public annual reports assess the 
eﬀectiveness of their internal controls over ﬁnancial 
reporting.  This requirement has had important eﬀects 
on corporate processes and has led many companies 
to incur signiﬁcant costs.  Some market participants 
have questioned whether the beneﬁts of this process 
justify its costs.  A separate chapter later in this report 
discusses that issue.)
The Judgmental Nature of  
Financial Information†
CED believes that the goal of ﬁnancial statements must 
be to provide a truly fair and clear presentation of the 
ﬁrm.  And for this to occur, markets must understand 
and accept that ﬁnancial information is to a large extent 
based on judgments.  
Even if the relationship between a board and its outside 
auditor is properly structured, a second problem in 
representing a company’s circumstances is that the 
representation is inherently judgmental and a result of 
many assumptions.  This has always been so, among 
other reasons because the true value of assets held 
at any time depends upon future income, which is 
inherently unknowable.  But it is especially true today.  
The present form of a ﬁnancial statement, formulated 
in the bricks-and-mortar society of yesteryear 
when most assets were tangible, is obsolete.  A large 
proportion of assets in today’s information- and 
knowledge-based economy are intangible, a fact that 
raises a host of new questions in the preparation of 
ﬁnancial statements. 
* On April 9, 2002, the Arthur Andersen partner in charge of 
auditing Enron, pled guilty to a single felony count of obstruction 
of justice. Federal prosecutors had charged him with orchestrating 
a large-scale eﬀort to destroy Enron-related documents in order 
to hinder a federal investigation. Two months later, Arthur 
Andersen itself was found guilty of a single count of obstruction 
of justice for its role in the destruction of documents. In late 2005, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Arthur Andersen’s 
felony conviction on the grounds that the jury instructions in the 
case were too broad. Based on this court decision, the Andersen 
partner moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and as this paper goes 
to press, the motion is still pending.
† This section draws substantially from a report of the American 
Assembly, a national, non-partisan public aﬀairs forum aﬃliated 
with Columbia University, titled “The Future of the Accounting 
Profession.”  The report was co-chaired by Roderick M. Hills,  
who also chaired CED’s subcommittee on corporate  
governance.  The American Assembly report is available at  
http://www.americanassembly.org.  
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Tangible assets can be depreciated – that is, their costs 
can be deferred and allocated against future revenues – 
relatively easily by amortization of historic costs based 
on a ﬁxed schedule. The ﬁxing of intangible values, 
however, although similar in theory, is more diﬃcult in 
practice.  Depreciation of either tangible or intangible 
assets requires that management employ various 
estimates and assumptions.  Because reasonable people 
will often make diﬀerent judgments on such matters, 
especially with respect to the value of intangibles, 
the inescapable conclusion is that it is not feasible to 
have “hard and fast” numbers in ﬁnancial statements.  
Rather, there is a range of numbers available depending 
on which estimates and assumptions are chosen.  
Consider, for example, the following questions.
What techniques yield the best valuations for such 
intangible assets as knowledge or brand value?
Over what period of time should expenditures for 
research and development be written oﬀ?
What approach should govern the ability of 
management to create reserves for contingencies 
and, by so doing, defer current income?
Although accounting rules for such issues exist, the 
answers to these questions are all debatable, with no 
universally “right” answer in reality.  Together, these 
examples illustrate the larger point that “proﬁts” or 
“revenues” are not like “temperature” or “mass” – they 
cannot be measured with precision.  If they could, we 
could simply require that they be measured according 
to scientiﬁc standards.  Instead, the standards by which 
proﬁts are measured, no matter how well thought-out, 
inherently require judgment.  The Economist magazine 
aptly described this problem as “the brittle illusion of 
accounting exactitude.”3
This leads to a variety of tensions within the corporate 
reporting and governance system.  The reality is that 
any depiction of revenue, cost, or net income in a 
large public corporation depends critically on the 
assumptions made by the depicter.  This problem  
has been exacerbated by recent trends in business.   
For example:
• In the past 25 years, balance sheets have 
acquired a far higher proportion of intangible 
assets, as “knowledge” (often in the form of 
expertise or embodied in software) rises in 
importance in the economy.  Valuation of an 
old-fashioned bricks-and-mortar ﬁrm was 
comparatively, though deceptively, simple, with 
the original cost of each tangible asset a known 
datum and estimated annual depreciation 
rates widely accepted.  But some analysts 
have demonstrated that the values of many 
companies’ intangible assets today are as large 
as, or larger than, their physical assets.4  These 
intangible assets are generally situation-speciﬁc 
and not traded in markets.  Their valuation, 
therefore, is inherently more diﬃcult to 
determine.
• The use of historic costs in ﬁnancial statements 
is being steadily replaced by current or 
“fair” values.  This has the potential to make 
statements more useful.  Historic costs for 
real estate, for example, may not capture 
substantial asset appreciation, and historic 
costs for equipment may underestimate the 
eﬀective rate of depreciation in the face of 
accelerating technological change.  But, again, 
such a change requires judgment.  Current 
or fair values require either active markets in 
which particular assets are traded, or a strong 
element of judgment in determining their 
value.  It should be noted that the use of fair 
values introduces more volatility into ﬁnancial 
statements.  Although such volatility makes 
period-to-period comparisons more diﬃcult, it 
attempts to reﬂect actual (ﬂuctuating) values of 
assets and liabilities.
• Sophisticated ﬁnancial engineering has created 
new ﬁnancial derivative products and risk-
management techniques that sometimes make 
it unclear what belongs on a balance sheet.  
These may create risks or rewards in the face of 
parameters such as interest rates that are not 
under the ﬁrm’s control, but might nonetheless 
be material.  A related problem concerns 
other special purpose entities that might be 
controlled by the ﬁrm, the consolidation of 
which must be determined as part of the audit.
These trends all exacerbate the problems associated 
with identifying a fair and clear depiction of the ﬁrm 
by requiring that judgment be exercised.  In times of 
heightened market awareness, such as the technology 
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bubble of the late 1990s, and for shareholders who 
trade rapidly based on earnings projections sharpened 
to the penny per share, the pressure on the ﬁrm to 
generate and report attractive but falsely precise 
earnings numbers becomes intense.  That pressure can 
lead to techniques of “earnings management” to ensure 
that over-precise forecasts are met.  
This broad problem is exacerbated by the desire for 
comparability across ﬁrms in the same industry, so that 
investors can compare companies.  The idea behind 
uniform standards is to lower the costs of investor 
decision-making by increasing comparability.  But, a 
quest for too much comparability sacriﬁces both detail 
and accuracy. Analysts have been on an endless, and 
ultimately fruitless, quest for perfect comparability 
of results among ﬁrms.  But most situations are 
unique, and each instance of judgment will diﬀer from 
every other. This is the “brittle illusion of accounting 
exactitude” in stark relief.
In practice, this conundrum is addressed through 
the required use of ﬁnancial accounting standards, 
so-called “generally accepted accounting principles” 
(GAAP).  In the extreme, these standards – often 
referred to as accounting “rules” – have been described 
as a second tax code that governs the decisions auditors 
and management make on a daily basis. 
CED believes that the distinction between an 
accounting system based on narrow rules and an 
accounting system based on broad principles should 
not be overstressed.  In its extreme, such a distinction 
is a false choice – the line between the two is not 
hard and fast.  Rules have principles, and principles 
have rules. Furthermore, as noted above, the integrity, 
ethics, and competence of management, plus rigorous 
oversight of the ﬁnancial reporting process, are as 
important as rules and guidelines for developing 
ﬁnancial information – an autonomous and vigorous 
audit committee will produce a better result than 
any particular set of rules.  Still, the point on which 
thoughtful commentators can agree is that in the 
United States we should have fewer rules and rely far 
more on judgment and integrity in their application.
Over the years, GAAP has been transformed from a 
set of underlying concepts or principles to a veritable 
maze of rules that has so dominated the system 
that, for all practical purposes, what the rules do not 
expressly forbid has been deemed to be allowed.
In recent years, therefore, accounting has become far 
too much an exercise in rule checking, rather than an 
attempt to achieve a truly fair and clear presentation 
of a company’s ﬁnancial position.  The language 
accompanying auditing opinions states that the audited 
ﬁnancial results “…fairly represent…the ﬁnancial position 
of the company, in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles.”  That simple statement has been 
tortured by lawyers and auditors alike to mean that any 
ﬁnancial statement that is in accordance with GAAP is 
necessarily “fair.” 
The race for ever more rules has been exacerbated 
by auditors who, fearful of litigation, have sought 
the precision of rules to avoid judgment that might 
be questioned in court.  But the existence of such 
an abundant and complex set of static rules invites a 
search for loopholes and may encourage circumvention. 
In the recent past, the ability to circumvent the spirit of 
the rules while still being in compliance with them (and 
therefore being able to represent the same) has meant 
that rules give a false sense of security.  At times, as a 
result, having rules can be more misleading than having 
no rules at all. 
Regulators have added to the problem, for example, 
when they insist on narrow interpretations of the 
rules and require companies to restate when they 
have not been followed in minute detail. Auditors 
and companies cannot be expected to risk being 
reprimanded by regulators and forced to restate  
their ﬁnancials because they attempted to implement 
rules “fairly” instead of as required in the letter of 
current regulations.
The inability of any set of “rules” to anticipate all of 
the situations that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial accounts must 
confront, and the potential for circumventing unduly 
rigid or narrow rules, should make it clear that we have 
gone much too far down the path of rules. Instead of 
providing accountants only with prescriptive rules, 
accounting standards should begin with a broad, 
over-arching set of principles.  Of course having 
too few rules can also be a problem.  Thus, the 
current thrust of U.S. regulators – FASB, PCAOB, 
and SEC – who have relied more heavily on rules, 
and European and Asian regulators – under the 
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banner of the International Accounting Standards 
Board– has been towards convergence of accounting 
standards.  Convergence would be especially helpful 
to multinational companies, which today have to meet 
diﬀering standards.
The agenda for improving ﬁnancial reporting, therefore, 
concerns how to redesign the ﬁnancial reporting 
process to reach appropriate judgments.  Part of this 
is a matter of the audit committees of boards living 
up to their responsibilities.  For too long, the choice 
among alternative assumptions, accounting treatments, 
questions of materiality, and the like was considered 
the province of management, leaving auditors and audit 
committees to ratify management’s judgment.  But 
this sometimes excessive delegation of responsibility 
is inconsistent with the responsibility of audit 
committees to provide a fair and clear presentation of 
the company’s ﬁnancial condition. 
Sarbanes-Oxley has changed this practice.  Now 
auditors must provide audit committees with all 
alternative treatments of ﬁnancial information 
that have been discussed with the corporation’s 
management, including the ramiﬁcations of those 
alternatives. Having that information means that audit 
committees now must determine whether management 
has chosen fairly from those alternatives. Auditors have 
the same responsibility. 
Recommendations
In light of these realities, the presentation of 
information in ﬁnancial reports must change, and the 
interested public’s understanding of that information 
must change as well.  CED makes the following 
recommendations regarding the provision of ﬁnancial 
information.
First, stock analysts, the investing public, and regulators 
must recognize the inherently judgmental character 
of accounting statements and ﬁnancial information.  
Businesspeople, regulators, investment managers, and 
other market participants must ensure that this reality 
is made clear, in particular through full disclosure, 
whenever possible. 
Second, it must be widely understood that judgments 
have an enormous impact on the numbers used in 
ﬁnancial statements.  Because ﬁnancial statements rely 
on judgments, accounting cannot continue to rely on 
the brittle illusion of accounting exactitude.  Ranges of 
values rather than precise numbers must be explained 
and understood as such.
This could be accomplished in any of several ways.  
Financial statements could present a “preferred” set 
of results (as approved by the board and its audit 
committee) and “alternative” results alongside them.  
Key results could be presented as estimates surrounded 
by ranges suggested by important assumptions.*  
Supplemental discussion of ﬁnancial results, akin to 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis or in the form 
of expanded notes accompanying ﬁnancial statements, 
could be required as part of standard quarterly and 
annual reporting.  Most important, whatever the form 
in which judgments and alternative treatments play a 
role in ﬁnancial reporting, regulators should encourage 
a format that ensures that management’s presentation 
is fair, clear and best understood by investors.
Third, ﬁnancial statements should be supplemented 
with important non-ﬁnancial indicators of value in 
order to understand better the ﬁrm’s situation.  Some 
detailed examples of this type of reporting have been 
developed by the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Consortium.5  These examples illustrate, among other 
things, how a company might display in matrix form 
a sensitivity analysis of the impact of changes in such 
variables as currency exchange rates, interest rates, 
GDP growth, and sales price on the company’s revenue, 
net operating cash ﬂow, and economic value added.6
Especially in the knowledge-based economy, a given 
set of ﬁnancial results can arise from a wide range of 
underlying operating conditions.  As a prime example, a 
bricks-and-mortar ﬁrm might show a given level of net 
income and a substantial value of as-yet-undepreciated 
physical assets on its balance sheet.  Alternatively, an 
information-based ﬁrm might have the same current 
net income but far less in apparent assets, because its 
earnings were generated by employee knowledge and 
* Some analysts have noted that “ranges” for estimates are usually 
construed as being statements of the range over which the value of 
a statistical variable has a certain percentage probability of occur-
ring given an underlying inherent distribution.  They express the 
concern that ranges in ﬁnancial statements might be construed in 
the same manner – that, for example, the “true” value of net earn-
ings has a 95 percent probability of being with the range.  Presen-
tations would have to be explicit regarding the implications of the 
ranges they present in order to avoid this confusion.
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skills, the costs of which were expensed.  Analysts 
might look at the information-based ﬁrm and 
incorrectly assume either a much higher rate of return 
on investment, or a depleted asset base.  But even a 
comparison with a similar ﬁrm in the same industry 
could be problematic, with no meaningful asset values 
to measure and compare.  How might ﬁnancial reports 
fairly depict the condition of such a ﬁrm or for that 
matter any ﬁrm that relies signiﬁcantly on  
intangible assets?
Pursuit of this end – the goal of ﬁnancial reporting, 
providing investors with a fair depiction of the 
ﬁrm – may involve presentation of some non-
ﬁnancial indicators of value (subject to protecting 
conﬁdential information that is truly essential to the 
competitiveness of the ﬁrm, and protecting the ﬁrm 
from exposure to lawsuits for good-faith eﬀorts to 
provide more information), as is now undertaken by 
many ﬁrms.*  Financial analysts and economists are 
the sources for numerous examples of indicators, such 
as vacancy rates for hotel chains.  Recognizing that any 
possible indicator could be manipulated and distorted, 
much as could any projection of future dollar income, 
auditors and corporate boards will need to exercise 
judgment in their presentations, and investors will 
need to exercise no less diligence in interpreting these 
reports.  Much of this information is already available 
in scattered sources, in particular from ﬁnancial 
analysts who track individual companies – the goal of 
reporting would be to integrate it within the ﬁnancial 
results to create a fuller depiction of the ﬁrm.  Properly 
executed, such presentations could reduce somewhat 
the reﬂex reliance on pennies-per-share estimates, and 
the impulse toward earnings management that follows 
from it.7  Although such a system may take time to 
develop fully, CED believes that we must get started on 
this road.
Fourth, auditors should not be required, or assumed, to 
“attest” to speciﬁc numbers, such as earnings per share.  
Auditors’ attestations should be seen as an opinion 
on whether the ﬁnancial statements taken as a whole 
are fairly stated, not whether each number is precisely 
correct. If their “attestations” are properly qualiﬁed, 
investors will be on notice of the unavoidable ambiguity 
in the numbers.
Fifth, ﬁnancial disclosures should be as clear and concise 
as possible, so as not to confuse the reader or bury 
unfavorable information.  Proxy statements and annual 
reports now frequently run to 100 pages or more, and 
the use of obscure language makes it relatively easy 
for a company to hide bad news.  Financial disclosures 
should be written in plain English.  They should aim 
towards the spirit of transparency, not just the letter 
of the law.  It has been noted, for example, that Enron 
“disclosed” in its 2000 annual report some $2 billion 
of complex ﬁnancial transactions with entities run and 
partly owned by its chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer.  But those 
disclosures were incomprehensible and  “buried at page 
48, footnote 16 of Enron’s annual report.”8 
The Issue of Litigation
“Rules-based” accounting arose in part because of 
the desire by accountants and auditors for a “clear, 
bright line” between legal and fraudulent practices.  In 
contrast, when judgment is needed to supplement or 
replace adherence to rules or other guidelines, a variety 
of questions are raised regarding the legal recourse of 
the investor and the exposure of auditors and boards.  
CED recognizes that such judgments are not likely to 
be made unless some protection can be developed to 
shield those making the judgments from unwarranted 
challenges from private, third-party litigation (as 
distinguished from regulatory action, which may also 
inhibit the use of judgment).
The risk is that, without such protection, the judgment 
used by the company and its auditors might or might 
not be found deﬁcient, depending on the court and 
the moment.  As is noted repeatedly in this statement, 
accounting assumptions and treatments are an area 
within which “reasonable people may diﬀer.”  The 
responsibility of management, auditors and boards is 
to guide investors through this thicket of uncertainty.  
Audit committees in particular will have to understand 
clearly the judgments that have been made and 
take responsibility for assuring investors that the 
* In December 2002, the American Institute of Certiﬁed Public 
Accountants (AICPA) created a special committee on enhanced 
business reporting, which launched the Enhanced Business 
Reporting Consortium (EBRC). The EBRC envisions itself as  
“A Consortium of stakeholders collaborating to improve the 
quality, integrity, and transparency of information used for 
decision-making in a cost eﬀective, time eﬃcient manner.”  
Among other aspects of reporting, the EBRC addresses key  
performance indicators such as those discussed here.  
See http://www.ebr360.org.  
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condition of the company is accurately represented by 
ﬁnancial statements.  But the system cannot function 
if individuals incur legal exposure in the process of 
providing additional information through reasonable 
judgments.
CED has frequently commented on its support for 
legal liability reform, and shares with many Americans 
the concern that litigiousness has negatively aﬀected 
many corners of the economy and society.9  But our 
goal is neither to address the problem of whether 
our society has too many plaintiﬀs, nor somehow 
to “move the line” regarding litigation.  Rather, our 
goal is to keep the “line” where it is – to stop it from 
moving, as an unintended result of necessary changes 
in accounting practices, and further inhibiting the 
necessary application of judgment.  Our view is that the 
reasonable exercise of judgment in preparing ﬁnancial 
statements should not be subject to excessive litigation 
so long as the judgment is made in a transparent and 
informed manner, free of fraud.  
This is a reasonable standard, but its implementation is 
diﬃcult in practice.  However, such a standard could be 
widely accepted once the SEC, supported by the new 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, demon-
strates its capacity to monitor ﬁrms and their reporting 
on ﬁnancial statements for misrepresentation or other 
high-risk behavior.  
Audit failures have invariably been by companies on 
the “watch list” of their external auditor, a list which is 
already shared with the PCAOB.*  PCAOB’s main-
tenance of such a watch list, plus the SEC’s massive 
electronic “Edgar” database of all ﬁlings, could help 
to set inspection priorities to protect the public.  The 
PCAOB, by assigning an inspector to review the audit 
of each ﬁrm on the watch list, perhaps annually, in the 
manner that the Comptroller of the Currency uses 
bank examiners, would provide signiﬁcantly improved 
investor protection. 
The system should be redesigned starting with the 
premise that any misbehavior uncovered by these 
inspections will be dealt with either by the PCAOB, 
the SEC, or the Justice Department, depending on 
the severity of the oﬀense.  With that assurance to 
the public, the SEC, strengthened by the inspection 
capacity of the PCAOB, could use its existing authority 
to provide a limited “safe harbor” that would prevent 
third-party litigation from challenging good-faith 
judgments made by auditors.  Any such safe harbor 
would need to be constructed carefully and would 
not be politically feasible until the PCAOB has 
demonstrated its capacity to examine the high-risk 
audits.  At the same time, any malfeasance by auditors 
would continue to be subject to challenge by the SEC 
and, in criminal cases, by the Justice Department.  The 
PCAOB’s far greater access to both the auditing ﬁrms 
and to the high-risk audits enhances the government’s 
ability to go after the most egregious cases of 
accounting manipulation.  
An alternative to the “safe harbor” approach could be 
the creation of a special federal court for adjudicating 
such disputes, as now exists for such functions as 
bankruptcy or family law.
The relief provided to good-faith auditors by such a 
system of safe harbors or expert courts would further 
encourage the prudent use of judgment, leading to 
more transparent and informative ﬁnancial statements.  
The long-term interests of investors would be better 
served than they would be by extending the cycle of 
litigation, which in turn would only encourage more 
“defensive accounting.”
The approaches advocated here would encourage 
audit committees to pursue their assignments with 
vigor, would enhance transparency, and could provide 
signiﬁcant improvements in the quality of the 
information provided to investors.  
* Audit ﬁrms maintain internal rankings of the risk in the audit 
process, such as from the risk of failure of the ﬁrm, past errors 
in the audit, management’s tone, etc.  These rankings may take 
any number of forms, such as numerical rankings or grades, but 
inevitably designate those ﬁrms in the greatest danger of failure.  
Following a convention often found in the audit industry, we refer 
to these ﬁrms as the “watch list.”
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Since the SEC acted in 1997, bolstered by the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, publicly traded corporations 
have been required to maintain adequate internal 
controls on their ﬁnancial reporting.  Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 further bolsters that 
obligation by requiring these companies to make an 
annual assessment of the eﬀectiveness of their internal 
controls.  Additionally, each corporation’s independent 
auditors are now required to audit and report on 
management’s assessment process. 
This requirement has become the center of a growing 
debate.  To the detractors, Section 404 is a cost burden 
with little real return – some call it a “compliance 
tax” on public companies.  They see the compliance 
costs created by Section 404 as discouraging private 
companies from going public, and perhaps driving some 
public companies private.  There may well be cases in 
which this has occurred, and there are undoubtedly 
steps that could be taken by the SEC and the PCAOB 
to reduce unnecessary costs; the situation of smaller 
ﬁrms requires particular attention.  But on balance, 
CED believes that Section 404 is a positive element of 
the American corporate governance system.  It forces 
management to do formally what they had too often 
not done even informally: to review their internal 
control systems and discover ways to improve them.  
The greater problem is that the basic audit has 
become a commodity that is seen by management as 
having little intrinsic value.  Section 404 provides an 
opportunity to integrate the external audit with the 
404 process and make the uniﬁed eﬀort a far more 
valuable management tool.  Those long-term beneﬁts of 
Section 404 should not be forgotten in the context of 
its short-term, and in some measure one-time, costs. 
The Value of Section 404
Section 404’s detractors see it as a tax.  The danger 
is that some companies will treat it that way.  Just as 
too many companies treated their audits as check-
oﬀ exercises, Section 404 compliance can become an 
expensive appendage to management processes for 
those companies that ignore its positive aspects.
However, a growing number of companies are coming 
to see their investments in the Section 404 process 
as having created a valuable management tool.  By 
forcing their attention to the control process, Section 
404 allows management to identify weaknesses and to 
understand their businesses better.
Many ﬁrms report that the compliance process has 
allowed them to identify control-design improvements 
and to consider the underlying business processes.  
Potential improvements include the ability to 
standardize processes, to share best practices across 
business units, to leverage technology in improving 
processes, and to focus better on strategic issues 
revealed by the Section 404 process.  
And if the process yields improved investor conﬁdence, 
as intended, beneﬁts would extend to more eﬃcient 
capital markets and better allocation of capital in 
the economy as a whole.  A May 2004 survey by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors concluded that almost 
a third of respondent ﬁrms approach Sarbanes-Oxley 
with long-term plans for achieving compliance beyond 
the attestation required by law.  Forty percent see the 
law as an opportunity to create value for the company.  
Investors have the same perception.  A study by 
McKinsey & Company found that investors are willing 
to pay a 14 percent premium for better governance.10
III. Improving Presidential Campaign FinanceIII. What is the Public Comp ny’s 
Representation to the Public? Section 404 
and the Nature of Internal Controls
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Then-SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson  
recently summarized this calculus in a letter to the  
Wall Street Journal:
…Public companies have been working 
overtime to document and assess the 
eﬀectiveness of their internal controls over 
ﬁnancial reporting, and their accounting ﬁrms 
have been diligently testing and preparing 
reports regarding those controls. This eﬀort will, 
of course, help to protect against fraud and the 
misuse of corporate assets. But it should also 
improve the quality of information companies 
report to their shareholders, along with the 
quality of information management relies on to 
make decisions. So while investors will beneﬁt 
from enhanced protection against misconduct, 
they may also ﬁnd that the companies they have 
invested in are better managed.
We are already seeing the results. A number 
of companies have uncovered lurking 
weaknesses in their controls and disclosed 
what they have found, and are working to 
strengthen them. Armed with information 
about these weaknesses and the remediation 
plans, investors appear to be making reasoned 
judgments about whether those disclosures 
aﬀect the mix of information they use to make 
investment decisions.11
In a 2004 Oversight Systems Financial Executive 
Report on Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, 74 percent 
of ﬁnancial executives said that their companies had 
received beneﬁts from Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, and 
57 percent said that they believed the costs incurred 
were a good investment for shareholders.12  Reﬂecting 
this sense, General Electric Chairman and CEO Jeﬀery 
R. Immelt wrote in his 2004 Letter to Shareholders:
None of us likes more regulation, but I actually 
think SOX 404 is helpful. It takes the process 
control discipline we use in our factories 
and applies it to our ﬁnancial statements. 
Implementing SOX 404 cost GE $33 million 
in 2004. But we think it is a good investment 
… Investors should demand high standards 
of governance and great performance. Some 
managers failed investors in the late ‘90s. 
Companies were destroyed, value was lost, and 
billions are being paid because of fraud. This 
happened. SOX 404 is by no means perfect, 
but it is a price we are willing to pay to restore 
investor trust.13
The Costs of Compliance
The costs of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley, driven 
by implementation of Section 404, are sizable.  Foley 
& Lardner, a law ﬁrm, noted in its survey of 2004 
compliance costs that “the average cost of being public 
has increased 223 percent for public companies with 
under $1 billion in annual revenue since the enactment 
of Sarbanes-Oxley.”14  The survey also noted that the 
average cost of being public for these same companies 
rose by 33 percent between 2003 and 2004 alone.15  In 
2004, General Electric reported spending $33 million 
on Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.  Similarly, Boeing and 
Kraft Foods reported 90 percent increases in audit fees 
from 2003 to 2004, which can largely be attributed to 
eﬀorts to comply with the new regulations set forth by 
Sarbanes-Oxley.16  A survey conducted by Financial 
Executives International of 217 companies found 
that they spent, on average, $4.36 million complying.  
Companies with over $5 billion in revenue averaged 
costs of over $10 million; ﬁrms with under $5 billion in 
revenue spent an average of $2.7 million.  Compliance 
costs likely vary signiﬁcantly according to many ﬁrm 
characteristics as well as mere size.17
The true costs are not yet known, and these estimates, 
however accurate, are typically made for only the 
ﬁrst year of implementation, in which one-time ﬁxed 
costs of setting up compliance systems were assumed.  
Substantial costs have been incurred developing new 
control systems, documenting existing ones, and 
training employees in the proper use of both.  Some 
costs were incurred because the regulations were still 
being written as companies and auditors were already 
trying to meet new standards.  Uncertainty and caution 
on the part of many auditors caused them to refuse 
to oﬀer advice to clients out of concern that doing so 
would compromise their independence.  There were 
costs incurred in repairing the pre-existing control 
deﬁciencies that were found.18  Once what amounts to 
“deferred maintenance” of compliance systems is out of 
the way, steady-state costs should be lower; a survey of 
90 of the Fortune 1000 companies yielded an estimate 
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of 46 percent lower costs for 2005 relative to 2004.19  
Moreover, any reviews of ﬁnancial and accounting 
controls that were undertaken before Sarbanes-Oxley 
are probably built into estimates of current costs.  
Again, these ﬁgures do not tell us whether the eﬀort 
has produced results; implementation costs are evident 
immediately, but beneﬁts may emerge only over time.  
The most consistent complaints regarding Section 404 
relate to timing and to ﬁrm size.  Many companies 
were slow to understand the eﬀort required by Section 
404.  In many cases, they struggled to catch up and 
had to devote extra eﬀort to rectify control deﬁciencies 
resulting from years of “deferred maintenance.” The 
supply of accountants is relatively ﬁxed in the short 
term, and there are now not enough to go around.  The 
Big Four accounting ﬁrms are shedding clients and 
turning away new ones.  The small number of major 
accounting ﬁrms and their market power is a matter 
of concern, and has, in some ways, tipped the balance 
between management and external auditors back to  
the auditors.20  
Some companies complain that their external auditors 
refused to accept the work done by the internal audit 
process and, thus, have incurred unnecessary expense 
by repeating that work.  These complaints appear to be 
legitimate, and the PCAOB has taken steps to alleviate 
this issue.
This overall 404 problem is particularly pressing for 
smaller companies.  Many of these companies have 
had only informal controls in place.  For them, the 404 
process has proven to be diﬃcult and expensive.  The 
Foley & Lardner study cited above estimated that audit 
fees for companies in the S&P Small-Cap 600 index 
rose an average of 84 percent in FY2004, to over $1 
million.21  Based on reports from small businesses, the 
SEC in September 2005 voted to extend to July 2007 
the deadline for small business compliance with Sec-
tion 404.  That extension, however, was accompanied 
by an admonition from SEC Chairman Christopher 
Cox that the decision to delay implementation “in no 
way reﬂects a desire to back away from the letter or 
spirit of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements.”22  
While CED believes that the implementation of 
the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 
will provide a substantial net beneﬁt for American 
businesses in general, we also acknowledge that the 
ongoing costs (in dollars and other resources) of 
compliance and certiﬁcation will be relatively higher 
for small and mid-sized companies. For many such 
companies, the projected costs of ongoing compliance 
(after the initial “investment”) could make the 
diﬀerence between an adequate return on shareholders’ 
investment and one that will put into question their 
economic viability as independent entities.  Such an 
outcome could have profound implications for the 
process of capital formation in this country.
CED does not recommend a broad exemption to 
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements for small-capitalization 
companies, but nevertheless believes that the process 
through which ongoing compliance and certiﬁcation 
is achieved should be re-visited, and ways to mitigate 
the cost to smaller companies should be explored.  
Some of the ideas that have surfaced in the public 
arena, such as shifting to a three-year cycle rather than 
annual certiﬁcation, using more risked-based auditing 
techniques, or reviewing the company-level controls 
functions within the “COSO standards,” deserve 
further consideration.*  
CED’s Recommendations
We do not believe that Sarbanes-Oxley requires 
legislative changes.  CED sees room to tailor the 
requirements imposed by Section 404 within the 
existing statute, and endorses the implementation 
guidance released by the PCAOB and SEC based on 
their evaluation of the ﬁrst-year experience with section 
404.  The guidance, issued simultaneously by the two 
agencies in May 2005, should lower the costs and 
increase the value of section 404 compliance.
The guidance emphasizes integrating audits of 
internal control with audits of ﬁnancial statements; 
exercising judgment to tailor work to high-risk areas 
rather than using standardized checklists; using a 
top-down approach to distinguish between areas 
that require further testing and areas that may safely 
be disregarded; using the work of internal auditors 
* COSO refers to The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
(“COSO”) of the Treadway Commission’s publication, Internal 
Control – Integrated Framework (the “COSO Report”).  An 
exposure draft, released by COSO in October 2005, proposes new 
guidelines to reduce the section 404 compliance costs for smaller 
companies.  As CED’s report is being prepared for publication, the 
COSO draft can be accessed at <http://www.ic.coso.org/>. 
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and others whose work can be trusted; and engaging 
in direct communication between management and 
external auditors on various issues before decisions are 
made or controls put into place. 
Two aspects of the agencies’ guidance are particularly 
important.  First is the agencies’ call for an integrated 
audit.  We believe the entire audit process should be 
redesigned, in light of the productive and beneﬁcial 
aspects of Section 404 compliance, to make the 
external audit of ﬁnancial statements and the Section 
404 audit of internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting a 
single process.  An integrated audit would be far more 
of a management tool than is today’s external ﬁnancial 
audit, which has become too much of a commodity.  
Second is the emphasis placed on the use of judgment.  
Both the PCAOB and the SEC placed strong emphasis 
on “reasoned good faith exercise of professional 
judgment focused on reasonable, as opposed to 
absolute assurance.”    
There is evidence, as indicated above, that the 
accounting ﬁrms and the corporate community at 
large are becoming aware of the potential for such 
positive developments, which would beneﬁt ﬁrms and 
shareholders alike. 
Substantial ﬁnancial and ethical abuses by corporations 
imposed signiﬁcant costs on shareholders, workers, 
and society at large.  A large-scale legislative remedy 
imposed its own costs of transition, and involved its 
own inevitable uncertainty and inexactitude.  Over 
time, after implementation problems are encountered 
and solved, and start-up costs are absorbed, the greater 
information and security for shareholders, and the  
improved internal control for ﬁrms, should yield  
substantial net beneﬁts for all parties.
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Over the past 20 years, the average pay of top corporate 
managers has become dramatically, and in our view too 
often unjustiﬁably, higher.  That is true both in absolute 
terms and in comparison to the wages of the average 
corporate employee.  Three researchers from U.S. 
business and law schools report that the average CEO 
of a company included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 
stock index made 400 times what the average worker of 
such a company earned in 2000, in contrast to 82 times 
that pay only eight years before.23  Other researchers 
using a diﬀerent methodology found a multiple of 300 
times in 2000, compared with only 24 times in 1965.24  
Pay diﬀerentials have apparently declined somewhat 
since the end of the Internet boom but remain at vast 
multiples of the diﬀerences of earlier years.  These 
burgeoning diﬀerentials have made executive pay a 
matter of public scrutiny, and the issue has gained 
added prominence because of the extraordinary 
compensation obtained by CEOs in numerous recent 
high-proﬁle cases of corporate fraud.
In CED’s view, the disparity of income between top 
corporate executives and average employees is a cause 
for serious concern, because it is socially divisive and 
casts doubt on the fairness of the market system.  In 
addition, such pay disparity is contagious, spilling 
over to other parts of the economy.  CED continues 
to believe that compensation should be determined by 
the market, and that it must reﬂect the productivity 
of the individual in question.  We are fundamentally 
opposed to speciﬁc rules, laws, or regulations that 
place artiﬁcial limits on compensation, or that prohibit 
boards from making compensation decisions based 
on the performance of the individuals involved, 
fairly appraised.  But we are concerned that the 
diﬀerentials that exist today too often reﬂect neither 
market conditions nor individual performance.25  Our 
view is that the process for determining executive 
compensation has been broken at far too many of 
our larger corporations.  This is borne out in studies 
demonstrating no statistically signiﬁcant relationship 
between compensation and performance measures.26  
Thus, the presence of these sizable pay diﬀerentials is 
a troubling indicator that something is wrong in the 
process by which executive pay is determined.
The solution to excessive executive compensation must be 
regarded as a matter of process and disclosure.*  At the 
center of this process sits the compensation committee 
of the corporate board.  Compensation committees 
propose executive pay packages, which are approved 
by the full board.  This requires that the compensation 
committee has an informed and objective view of 
management’s performance, a sense of a market-
determined value of management’s services, and the 
ability to negotiate with the CEO at arm’s length.  It 
must also have comprehensive information about the 
total compensation package including special retirement 
beneﬁts, other deferred compensation, and awards 
in the event of early termination of a top executive 
or change of control of the company, and what that 
package could be under diﬀerent possible circumstances.  
At present, the process of information gathering, 
especially in larger companies, often involves 
compensation consultants who provide the board with 
a distribution of executive compensation packages at 
a range of chosen “comparable” companies.  At this 
point, the system too often breaks down.  Consultants 
present the board with a distribution of comparables, 
which can be chosen to predispose the process toward 
higher pay.  The board is left to determine where their 
IV. How Should Managers Be Paid?  
The Problem of Executive Compensation
* We note that as this paper goes to press, the SEC has published 
for comment proposed rules to enhance disclosure requirements 
for executive compensation.  
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CEO should be placed within the distribution.  But 
boards too often lack performance goals to make 
this judgment, too readily accept the “comparables” 
as being correct, and lack a holistic view of the entire 
compensation package.  They may be extremely 
hesitant to depict their CEO’s performance as being 
“below average” for fear of not only oﬀending the 
CEO, but also depicting themselves as being incapable 
of ﬁnding a better CEO, and sending a public signal 
that ﬁrm performance has been sub-par.  Thus, the 
inclination is to categorize the CEO as superior to 
his or her peers, with a salary in the higher part of the 
population of “comparables,” in a fashion reminiscent of 
the mythical Lake Woebegone, where “all the children 
are above average.”  The result is that the distribution 
of “comparables” keeps rising, creating a spiral of total 
executive compensation.
Recommendations
CED supports a set of seven recommendations, the 
ﬁrst ﬁve of which were put forward by its Trustee, 
Peter G. Peterson, Chairman of the Blackstone Group 
and co-chair of the Conference Board Commission on 
Public Trust and Private Enterprise, and echoed in the 
recommendations endorsed by that group.
First, compensation committees should adopt 
measurable, speciﬁc, and genuinely challenging goals 
for the performance of their businesses, and judge 
management on their ability to achieve them.  These 
goals should be ﬁnancial (such as returns on assets, 
investment, or equity), strategic (market share, quality 
improvement), operational (margins, revenues or 
proﬁts), and social (such as adherence to the corporate 
code of conduct, communication of ethical standards 
to employees, environmental compliance, worker 
retention).  These standards should be challenging to 
management; the board must not in eﬀect lower the 
bar to ground level, such that management cannot 
possibly fall short.  Once agreed upon by the board, 
these standards should be the yardstick by which 
management is measured. 
Second, the compensation process must be run by 
independent compensation committees.  Compensation 
consultants, if any, should have no business or other 
relationships with management (neither should the 
ﬁrms for which they work).  They should be hired by 
and report to a compensation committee of the board 
that is autonomous from management, and that 
controls the terms of the consultant’s engagement.  
Compensation committees should consider engaging 
new entrants and others beyond the usual consultants.  
If the ﬁrm is too small to hire a consultant, or if in 
any event a consultant of suﬃcient independence 
cannot be engaged, then the compensation committee 
must meet the strict standards of unbiased judgment.  
The compensation committee should have direct 
authority over all terms of management’s contracts, 
including all forms of compensation (pay packages, 
retention, retirement, major perquisites, and so on), 
and they should thoroughly scrutinize those terms and 
understand their potential interactions.  
Third, management should have a substantial equity 
interest in their company.  This interest should be over 
and above equity derived through options or grants.  
Barring exceptional circumstances, management should 
act as “buy and hold” investors.
Fourth, management should make a full, timely, 
and transparent disclosure of its compensation to 
stockholders.  The compensation discussion should 
be presented in one place in the company’s disclosure, 
including all forms of compensation.  Disclosures 
should be comprehensive and easily understandable.  
They should make clear how “comparables” were 
chosen and how top oﬃcers would be compensated 
under plausible retirement or change-of-control 
situations.27  They should not be written to obfuscate 
or hide information by overwhelming the reader with 
unrelated, useless information.  As this report is being 
prepared for publication, the SEC has voted to propose 
new disclosure rules for executive compensation.  At 
ﬁrst glance, these rules appear to carry out CED’s 
recommendation for improved disclosure.  (See Box.)
Disclosures can be a powerful tool to curb excess 
compensation that has long remained hidden, and 
the SEC should consider better ways of showing the 
relative size of executive compensation and its trend.  
For example, it could require companies in their annual 
proxy statements to calculate and disclose the ratio 
of the present value of their CEO’s compensation 
compared to the company’s average full-time employee 
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over several years.*  The display of such a ﬁgure 
would allow boards, investors and others to evaluate 
its appropriateness and its comparability to similar 
calculations in other companies.†  
Fifth, choices of forms of compensation should promote 
the long-term value of the ﬁrm, rather than exploit 
favorable accounting or tax treatment.  We note that 
recent changes in accounting for stock options require 
that options be expensed on the accounting statements 
of public companies.  The expensing of options should 
neutralize a bias that has favored their use in recent 
years.  The compensation committee must make  
clear the eﬀect of its compensation decisions on 
stockholder dilution.
Sixth, severance compensation, like all other forms of 
executive compensation, should be reviewed carefully 
against criteria set by the compensation committee of 
the board, and the board should publicly provide full 
Proposed SEC Changes to Disclosure of Executive Compensation
On January 17, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission published for comment proposed rules 
to enhance disclosure requirements for executive compensation and related matters (notably related party 
transactions and director independence). The following is a summary of the proposed changes.  Companies 
would be required to prepare most of this information using plain English principles in organization, language 
and design.  
The centerpiece of the proposal is to change the currently required tabular presentation of executive pay and 
to improve the narrative discussion.  The objective is to provide a complete disclosure of compensation of 
the principal executive oﬃcer, principal ﬁnancial oﬃcer, and the three other highest paid executive oﬃcers.  
Disclosure rules would also apply to the company’s directors and to employees other than the named executive 
oﬃcers who are paid more than those executives. 
Disclosure of executive compensation would be organized into three broad categories and reported for the last 
three years: cash compensation; equity-related compensation that is a source of future gains; and perquisites, 
retirement plans and other post-employment payments and beneﬁts.  A summary column would add all 
forms of compensation into a single, comprehensive number.  (Rules may allow small businesses to avoid high 
compliance costs by publishing a single compensation ﬁgure for executives.) 
Equity-based awards, including stock and stock options, would be reported as a present-value dollar number 
measured as the fair value on the grant date, as computed according to newly applicable accounting standards 
(FAS 123R).  Two supplemental tables would report grants of performance-based awards and grants of all 
other equity awards.  These tables would indicate amounts realized on equity compensation during the last 
year and amounts that may be received in the future. 
An “all other compensation” column would include the aggregate increase in actuarial value of pension plans 
accrued during the year and all earnings on deferred compensation that is not tax-qualiﬁed.  Also included 
would be disclosure of amounts payable on termination or change in control.  Other compensation would 
include any perquisites valued at the new lower threshold of $10,000. 
A new narrative section called Compensation Discussion and Analysis is modeled after the Management 
Discussion and Analysis section required in current ﬁnancial reports.  The new compensation discussion 
would address the objectives and implementation of executive compensation programs.  It would focus on key 
factors underlying compensation policies and decisions.
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission Fact Sheet, January 17, 2006
* The basic concept, which should include auditor veriﬁcation, 
is subject to various permutations based on the deﬁnition of 
compensation, the person or group subject to disclosure, and so 
on.  One simple variation would be for companies to report the 
ratio of the CEO’s compensation, as reported to the IRS on  
the W-2 form, to a similarly calculated amount for the average 
full-time employee.
† See Memorandum by Josh Weston (p.45).
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details of awards and explain publicly to shareholders 
the full reasoning behind the granting of such awards.  
Public conﬁdence in corporations has been impaired 
not only because of the mounting gap between top 
pay and average employee pay, and the relative rates 
of increases of pay awards at those levels, but also on 
account of rewards of extraordinary levels to CEOs as 
severance compensation.  Such compensation arises, 
in particular, when CEOs have been prevailed upon by 
boards of directors to resign, or as a result of mergers 
in which the CEO has played a central role.  In some 
cases, it has appeared that the level of compensation 
has been arbitrary, unrelated to any standard of 
executive performance pre-determined by the board 
of directors.  Companies would be well-advised both 
to rein in the amount of severance pay and to tighten 
conditions by which executives are compensated 
in change-of-control situations, for example, by 
stipulating that executives will only by compensated  
if they actually lose their jobs as a result of a merger  
or acquisition. 
High-proﬁle top-executive severance cases, such 
as those in recent times at the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Walt Disney Company, underscore 
the importance for corporate reputations and for 
shareholder conﬁdence of boards of directors fully 
and comprehensively familiarizing themselves with all 
aspects of complex executive contracts prior to voting 
for them, rather than relying too greatly on the views  
of management.  
Seventh, companies should have the right to recapture 
bonuses awarded to top executives in error, because 
ﬁnancial results justifying those awards later are 
restated adversely.  Executives should not reap rewards 
based on false information from inaccurate accounting. 
In 2004, amended ﬁlings for ﬁnancial restatements 
rose to a record 414.28  When accounts are restated and 
previously achieved targets no longer provide a basis for 
bonus awards, executives should be required to return 
those awards.  At present, Sarbanes-Oxley allows the 
SEC to require that bonuses be paid back only if there 
is evidence of misconduct.  In some cases, however, 
companies have also sought to recover bonuses even 
where fraud is not present.  International Paper, 
for example, has added provisions to its long-term 
incentive compensation plan to allow the company to 
recover compensation paid when there is a restatement 
of the company’s ﬁnancials.  Some companies, such as 
Nortel Networks, have sought and obtained voluntary 
repayment of bonuses from senior executives and have 
ﬁled lawsuits where voluntary compliance could not  
be achieved.29
In conclusion, corporate boards must fully appreciate 
that media attention to exceptionally large executive 
compensation packages, often in connection with 
disturbing revelations about a corporation’s practices, 
have contributed to an erosion of public conﬁdence in 
the leadership of major enterprises.  Thus, disclosure, 
as noted above, is especially important.  Corporations 
must make fully transparent to shareholders the 
criteria, methods and reasoning used in determining 
total compensation.  As we write this report, the SEC 
has indicated its intention to address the issue of 
companies’ reporting on executive compensation.  Only 
with transparency can trust in the system be restored.
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The Characteristics of a Sound  
Board of Directors
Eﬀective oversight by truly independent directors 
can prevent many of the kinds of abuses that have 
occurred in recent years. (See Appendix on the role 
of independent directors.)  Many of the conspicuous 
corporate governance breakdowns of the last ten 
years have been blamed on the failure of independent 
directors to monitor corporate managers properly.  
The earlier sections of this paper, and the press, 
have focused on the role of the audit committee, 
but the need for reform extends to the entire board.  
Independent directors play a key role.  Stock exchange 
listing standards require companies to have boards 
with a majority of independent directors and to 
have nominating and compensation decisions made 
by directors who are fully independent.  Listed 
companies are expected to have an executive session of 
independent directors at least once a year, and many 
boards now have executive sessions of independent 
directors at virtually every board meeting.  
Board Chemistry and Skill
What are the characteristics of a high-quality board 
of directors?  One is a blend of compelling and 
complementary talents, backgrounds, and perspectives.  
Another is cohesion, the ability to work together 
built around a shared commitment to the long-term 
well-being of the corporation.  A third is candor and 
openness to dissent and adherence to ethical standards, 
such that potential problems will be investigated fully.30
A fourth is a ﬁnely constructed, balanced relationship 
with management.  We have repeated throughout this 
statement the importance of a board’s independence 
Eﬀective stewardship by boards of directors requires 
a commitment to shareholder interests in the 
corporation, as opposed to the distinct and often 
diﬀerent interests of management.  But to meet this 
commitment, how should boards be assembled?  What 
is the right way to select directors – and therefore 
to represent shareholders in their dealings with 
management?
Although Sarbanes-Oxley calls attention to the role 
of the board’s audit committee, the board of directors 
as a whole is responsible for having systems in place 
to enable the corporation to comply fully with all 
laws and regulations, and to provide comprehensive 
and clear information to shareholders and the public.  
The board assigns speciﬁc areas of governance to its 
committees that typically include a compensation and 
nominating/governance committee in addition to the 
audit committee.  These committees are increasingly 
important in enabling the board as a whole to meet 
its responsibilities and to build public trust.  But the 
ability of these committees to do so depends to a very 
large degree on the manner in which the independent 
directors are selected.  
A paradox of corporate stewardship is that despite the 
principle that directors represent shareholders in the 
selection and retention of management, historically 
most directors have been selected by management.  
Where CEOs control the selection of directors, as they 
do in most companies, there will be a suspicion, often 
justiﬁed, that directors are not as independent as they 
are expected to be.   
V. How Should Corporate Boards Be 
Selected? The Issue of Shareholder Voting
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been found to be an “imperial” CEO.  And some 
companies have chosen to split the roles of CEO and 
chair with positive results.  But having a non-executive 
chair is not a panacea.  There is no way to be certain 
in advance whether the non-executive chair will be 
more interested in protecting the CEO from aggressive 
committee chairs than in conveying views of the board 
to the CEO.  
CED believes that should the chief executive oﬃcer hold 
the position of chairman of the board of directors, it is 
crucial that there be a clearly designated, and diligent, 
lead independent director.  That individual might 
logically be the chair of the nominating/governance 
committee, because he or she has a base within the 
board from which to work, and is already charged with 
the responsibility of holding the board to the highest 
ethical standards.
The function of a non-executive chair or a lead 
independent director, whether or not he or she is 
designated as the board chair, is among other things 
to organize the participation of all board members, 
participate in setting the agenda of the board, and be a 
conduit of communication to the CEO.  That person 
also has a role in ensuring appropriate follow-through 
on items requested by the board.  (The Appendix 
provides a broader list of suggested responsibilities for 
the lead independent director.)  A non-executive chair 
or a lead independent director is not empowered to run 
the corporation on a day-to-day basis, or to interfere 
with the work of the chief executive oﬃcer – or, for 
that matter, to protect the CEO from a diligent board, 
or to interfere in the work of such a board.  His or her 
role is to head oﬀ the potential for inside dealing that 
has followed from an excessive concentration of power 
and control. If a company has a lead director, he or she 
should not automatically rotate out of the position on 
a ﬁxed schedule.  It is important to have continuity 
of leadership and responsibility in the lead director 
position. 
Recent Proposals to Change the 
Nomination and Election Process
In the wake of the reconsideration of the role of 
boards following Enron and WorldCom, institutional 
shareholders have sought to exert greater inﬂuence 
from management.  But an independent relationship 
does not mean an adversarial one.  While a board needs 
to be independent of management, it also needs to be 
able to work with management, particularly the CEO, 
toward common goals.
These basic characteristics have implications for 
a good board selection process.  For one, a board 
needs to be considered as a whole – the skills and 
backgrounds of newly nominated individual members 
must complement those of the board’s other members.  
The ability of the board as a whole to carry out the 
functions of the board’s standing committees must also 
be taken into account.  
“Chemistry” among board members must be 
considered.  If the members do not have conﬁdence 
in each other, the board is not likely to be eﬀective.  
Similarly, the CEO of a corporation needs to have a 
level of comfort with prospective board nominees.  
If the CEO does not have conﬁdence in them, the 
company will suﬀer. 
The Role of the Non-Executive Chair  
or the Lead Director
The issue of the selection of board members gives rise 
to the question of the role of the lead member of the 
board, including whether that individual should be the 
non-executive chairman of the board, the chairman 
of the board’s governance committee, one of the 
independent directors or the chief executive oﬃcer of 
the ﬁrm.  There are no objective data to demonstrate 
that corporations operate more eﬃciently, or more 
ethically, in one form rather than another.  CED 
does not believe that one system ﬁts all.  However, 
independent leadership is essential.  The numerous 
cases of malfeasance at major corporations in recent 
times have highlighted situations where a dominant 
individual, holding both the CEO and chairman 
positions, has held perhaps excessive inﬂuence over 
corporate aﬀairs to the detriment of the corporation 
and the shareholders.  The mere ability of a CEO 
both to set the board’s meeting agenda, and to chair 
and control the discussion, would seem to present the 
potential for abuse absent the existence of some board 
function that can prevent such abuse.* 
A non-executive chair can sometimes be an 
improvement, by acting as a buﬀer to protect the board, 
and the company, from what has in some instances 
* See Memorandum by Peter Benoliel (p.45).
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investors are rarely in a position to hold even one 
percent, much less ﬁve percent, of a company’s stock,  
or to take on the search and transaction costs 
associated with board nominations, let alone a proxy 
election.  In reality, the “minority” investors who 
stand to beneﬁt the most from such a proposal are 
institutional investors such as mutual and pension 
funds. If any 5-percent shareholder can start a proxy 
ﬁght with the corporation’s money, the interests of the 
other shareholders can too easily be sacriﬁced.
During the second quarter of 2005, U.S. institutions 
held over 60 percent of domestic corporate equities, 
according to the Federal Reserve31, generally in larger 
blocks than individual investors hold.*  To be sure, 
many institutions (“funds”) may have the longer time 
horizons associated with investment rather than 
speculation, and many have tried to use their holdings 
to have a positive inﬂuence on the companies they hold. 
But this is not universally the case.  Some pension 
funds are administered either by elected government 
oﬃcials (in the instance of some public pension funds) 
or unions with interests that may be at odds with 
the long-term economic objectives of the companies 
in which they invest.  Other large holders are private 
fund managers who may be hesitant to act against 
management for fear of losing fund management 
business, such as the management of some part of the 
corporation’s savings trust or pension plan.†  Other 
large “minority” holders may have other business 
interests that raise potential conﬂicts; they may have 
board positions on ﬁrms that they buy and sell, or 
that they seek to combine, to the detriment of other 
shareholders.
There is no a priori way of knowing the extent to which 
these conﬂicts may occur.  But they will probably occur 
over the selection of directors.  Their initial proposal, 
since rebuﬀed, asked for the right under some limited 
circumstances to put forward their own candidates  
for board membership through access to a company’s  
proxy – a change that would signiﬁcantly reduce the 
cost of seeking a board seat.   
 A second proposal, discussed later in this section, 
would change the standard for director elections.
Direct Nomination by Shareholders
The issue of who will select the independent 
directors takes on added signiﬁcance in light of 
proposals considered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to allow shareholders, under certain 
circumstances, to nominate directly candidates for 
board membership.  One variant would allow a 
shareholder, or group of shareholders, owning at least 
one percent of voting shares outstanding for at least 
a year, access to the company’s proxy solicitation to 
nominate directors for election if they submitted a 
governance resolution that subsequently received more 
than 50 percent of the votes cast on it.  Another trigger 
would allow a shareholder, or group of shareholders, 
owning ﬁve percent of voting shares for one year, 
access to the company’s proxy solicitation to nominate 
directors if 35 percent or more of votes cast for one or 
more director nominees were “withhold” votes.  
At present, the SEC has shelved consideration of 
these proposals.  Nevertheless, many institutional 
shareholders and other commentators continue to press 
for such changes.
CED has serious concerns about these proposals, 
and others like them, to facilitate direct nomination 
of directors by shareholders.  CED does not, today, 
support proposals that would facilitate direct 
nomination of directors by shareholders.   Although the 
development and protection of “shareholder rights” is 
of indisputable importance, we believe that proposals 
to allow direct shareholder nominations may not be 
entirely consistent with that ideal.  Investors already 
have the right to propose nominations to a company’s 
nominating committee.
These proposals summon up images of “independent 
stockholders” – alternatively, widows and orphans, or, 
to the fears of many, advocates of political or social 
causes that might not be consonant with the best 
interests of all shareholders.  But these individual 
* Foreign investors held approximately 15 percent of U.S. equities.  
The remainder was comprised of U.S. households, non-proﬁts, 
and other entities. 
† Some investment funds do the opposite.  They delegate voting 
of portfolio securities to “independent” organizations such as 
Institutional Investor Services (ISS).  In doing so, they shift voting 
power from shareholders who have an economic interest to an 
organization with no direct economic stake in the corporation.  
CED is concerned about such practices and intends to address this 
and other issues in a follow-on report.  Our current view, however, 
is that funds should be transparent about how they vote proxies 
and they should not side automatically with either management or 
those who challenge management.  
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We note that several companies, initially led by Pﬁzer, 
have announced their intention to adopt a majority 
vote standard voluntarily.  In several cases, companies 
have revised their governance principles (although 
not their charter or by-laws) to require any director 
who received more “withheld” votes than “for” votes to 
submit his or her resignation to the board.  The board 
would then nominate a successor.
In principle, we support the view that an individual 
who does not have the support of a majority of voted 
shares should not be a director of a public company.  In 
practice, a majority-vote standard can take many forms.  
As legal committees, regulators, and legislatures examine 
the pros and cons of these forms, we believe individual 
companies are in the best position to judge what version 
of a majority-vote standard is most suitable. 
 
Reform of the Board’s Nomination 
Process: A Better Way to Construct  
a Board
The manner of selection and renomination of 
independent board members is of central importance 
in corporate governance.  But sound governance 
practices can build high-quality boards without adding 
new regulations on top of the substantial restructuring 
of Sarbanes-Oxley that is still being digested by the 
corporate community.  Companies can act on their own 
with enough regularity to challenge the assumption 
that institutional investors and fund managers have 
interests identical to those of “all shareholders,” 
particularly small investors.  
Also, it is almost impossible to imagine that a board 
assembled with one or more proxy ﬁghts could function 
constructively.  The ugliness of the ﬁght is not conducive 
to creating the cohesion that is essential to a well 
functioning board of directors. Although most boards 
would be unlikely to yield to such pressure, the notion 
that proxy ﬁghts could be started so easily would 
discourage a very large number of competent people 
from accepting a board position.
For these reasons, CED has serious concerns about 
proposals to give large minority shareholders more 
power over the board selection process.   
The Majority Vote Approach
A better ﬁrst step in using the annual meeting to 
reshape a board would be to adopt a version of what is 
often referred to as the “majority vote” condition.  This 
proposal is that corporations should agree that any 
director who has more than half the votes present at an 
annual meeting withheld from his election will not be 
allowed to take a seat on the board. 
Generally, state laws dictate that corporate directors 
are elected by the votes of a plurality of shareholders, 
unless otherwise provided in the corporation’s by-laws 
or charter.  Under a plurality standard, the candidates 
garnering the most votes are elected; they need not 
achieve a majority.  This might seem on the surface to 
be a robust process, and in contested elections it works 
well.  If there are 12 candidates seeking nine seats, 
the nine with the highest vote totals win.  However, 
contested board elections are rare in the United States.  
In the typical uncontested election, where, say, a slate 
of nine candidates is nominated for nine board seats, 
a plurality for any individual is guaranteed by just a 
single vote.*  
Changing the standard for electing directors, from a 
plurality of votes cast to a majority of votes cast, is seen 
by proponents – mostly institutional investors– as 
enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of 
corporate boards, without incurring the drawbacks of 
entitling shareholder nominations.  
* Current regulations allow shareholders only the choice of voting 
for a board candidate, or withholding their votes; and elections are 
decided by a plurality of votes.  Votes to withhold, under current 
regulations, have no eﬀect.  Accordingly, and in theory, a board 
candidate can be elected with a single aﬃrmative vote.  Following 
from this, there are actually three procedural considerations 
behind the apparently simple concept of “majority voting,” which 
requires, in the ﬁrst instance, considering votes to withhold 
support as negative votes, rather than merely ignoring them.  
The ﬁrst procedural consideration is whether a voting result is 
judged relative to the number of shares outstanding, or the smaller 
number of shares voted.  Virtually all discussion of this issue is in 
reference to the number of shares voted, because a large number 
of shareholders, including probably some of those most satisﬁed 
with the state of the corporation, simply do not bother to vote 
their shares.  A second consideration is how to handle abstentions.  
The third consideration under majority voting is whether, with 
both of the above questions settled, a board candidate must have 
a majority of votes cast “for” to be elected; or whether opponents 
must have a majority of votes cast “withhold” to defeat the 
candidate, in the event that some shares are abstained or the vote 
is measured relative to shares outstanding.
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acceptable options from which to choose.  For example, 
a large-sized corporation might interview between 9 
and 12 such candidates.  The nominating committee, 
with input from the CEO, selects a small number from 
that list, perhaps 3 in this example.  The board and 
CEO then interview the most promising candidates, 
of whom one is selected.  CED is aware of several 
corporations, for example Chevron, Chiquita Brands, 
and Time-Warner, that have established nominating 
processes substantially in this form.
In CED’s view, this type of process oﬀers investors the 
best chance of eﬀective representation.  It provides a 
broad search pool, reaching to talent that may not have 
been known to the CEO or the board.  It allows boards 
to be built with a balanced range of skills and a cohesive 
culture.  It prevents any one group of shareholders 
from having an inordinate role in determining the 
board’s composition.  And it leads to an eﬀective and 
independent board that nonetheless has the ability to 
work with management towards the corporation’s  
long-term ends.
This approach is based on best emerging practice, 
being put to the test by companies responding to their 
own needs and market conditions.  It does not require 
legislation or regulation that dictates a single approach 
for all companies, regardless of circumstances.  It can be 
copied and spread by emulation.  
Although we do not, at this time, support new 
legislation or a new regulatory eﬀort, we recommend 
that SEC Commissioners, and particularly the 
Chairman, publicly call on the corporate community 
to make the selection of directors independent of 
management control.   
CED’s approach has the advantage of allowing 
existing reforms to be digested, before another layer of 
restructuring of board processes is added on top of the 
previous ones.  Since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
boards have been laboring diligently to meet all the 
various new requirements.  A period of acclimation, in 
which market forces and emerging practices are allowed 
some interplay, could be helpful.  Current voluntary 
reforms should be given a chance to prove themselves, 
before we launch upon another round of regulation.  If, 
as we expect, a stronger nominating process produces 
better-quality and more cohesive boards, further 
actions may not be necessary.  
to bolster nominating committees and the committees’ 
processes for choosing new board candidates, 
evaluating the performance of existing board members 
eligible for re-nomination, and recommending 
committee assignments and chairmanships.  
The best approach to building high-quality boards is to 
assign to truly independent nominating committees the 
responsibility for recommending new board candidates 
and evaluating the performance of existing board 
members.  The nominating committee should also 
have the responsibility of recommending committee 
assignments.  
If the nominating committee is truly independent, it 
can build the kind of balanced and qualiﬁed board 
that would guard against the kind of governance 
abuses that have rocked the ﬁnancial markets and, 
through them, the economy. A process that weighs 
the characteristics of a high-quality board described 
above – how the board “ﬁts together,” how it will 
work with management– requires an independent 
nominating committee, much as eﬀective auditing 
requires an independent audit committee.  In fact, 
the independence and integrity of the nominating 
committee – in form and in practice – may be more 
important, because the nominating committee 
determines the membership from which all other 
committees are drawn.  
Whether a company is large or small, independent 
directors should begin the process of board selection 
by developing, without the participation of the CEO, a 
list of appropriate candidates.  The committee should 
independently exercise its best judgment about possible 
candidates, including candidates who are incumbent 
directors eligible for renomination. 
For larger companies that can aﬀord to hire recruiters, 
CED favors an approach along the following lines.  
First, the nominating committee hires a recruiting 
consultant – one that has no association with 
management – and discusses with the consultant 
the desired qualities of new directors.  Just as it is 
imperative that the auditor’s engagement be determined 
by the audit committee and not by management, the 
recruiter must report to, and be wholly obliged to, the 
nominating committee.  The recruiter then produces a 
list of prospective directors, of whom the nominating 
committee interviews several candidates that provide 
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VI. Conclusion
Relations between corporations and investors have 
suﬀered wrenching change in the last ﬁve years, from 
both corporate misdeeds and the legislative reaction 
to them.  For all of the damage and pain, there is the 
potential for ultimate beneﬁt to all parties, as better 
and more transparent information breeds renewed 
investor conﬁdence and higher standards of behavior 
and openness.
In this statement, CED has recommended some 
changes in practice to hasten this beneﬁcial adjustment.  
However, we would view such proposed change as 
modest, and within the scope of the recent revisions 
in corporate governance practices.*  CED believes 
that the wisest course now would be patience, to allow 
these new practices and institutions to be learned 
and understood, and to demonstrate their merit.  It 
is also imperative, however, that these new practices 
show discernable progress towards meeting the goal 
of restoring public conﬁdence in America’s public 
companies and their leaders.
* This report is largely conﬁned to speciﬁc areas of corporate ﬁnance and compensation.  However, CED is fully aware that public trust 
in corporate leadership also relates to perceived corporate ethics.  CED believes that corporate executives must demonstrate commitment 
to the highest ethical standards, to the full application of codes of corporate conduct, and to building sound ethical cultures within their 
organizations.  Each corporation must ﬁnd its own best approach to demonstrating that commitment.  Notably, special annual reports 
of several corporations have focused exclusively on corporate social responsibilities, including adherence to high ethical standards.  Such 
reports, which include candid disclosures of shortcomings and plans for improvement, can be valuable tools to encourage employee 
integrity and loyalty, convey valuable information to shareholders, and build public trust.
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Submitted by COLETTE MAHONEY, with  
which LINDA SMITH WILSON has asked to  
be associated.
p. 8.
This well done presentation will, I hope, be the 
foundation for continued studies, analyses, and 
critiques of the state of Corporate America. 
Submitted by JOSH WESTON, with which 
PETER BENOLIEL and LINDA SMITH WILSON 
have asked to be associated.
p. 25.
I think the CED recommendation on transparent 
disclosure of CEO compensation is unnecessarily 
general, as is the proposal that the SEC merely consider 
better ways of showing the relative size of a CEO’s 
compensation.  Seemingly full disclosures about 
compensation often result in voluminous, verbose, 
disaggregated information that is further complicated by 
footnotes and appendices that an average reader cannot 
readily or fully grasp in a modest amount of time.
Instead, I applaud the recent SEC full disclosure 
proposal and propose the following simple, new 
SEC mandate for all publicly owned companies in 
their annual proxy statement:  The Compensation 
Committee shall clearly report the ratio of its 
CEO’s W-2 compensation (line 1) to the average 
W-2 compensation of all of the company’s full-time 
employees, for each of the past three calendar years.  By 
using the W-2 deﬁnition of compensation, there need 
not be any additional recordkeeping or data ambiguity.  
By displaying the ratio for the past three years, unusual 
one-year blips could be seen in perspective, and 
explained in the text.
Furthermore, if each company displays this 
same, single, non-judgmental ratio, then boards, 
Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent
investors, and others could readily make their own 
determinations and draw their own conclusions.
If the Compensation Committee believes that 
the suggested simple W-2-based display does not 
appropriately or fairly present matters, it has the 
opportunity and obligation to add its comments in the 
same proxy statement.
I do note that when there is an intra-year or inter-year 
change of CEO within a company, some explanatory 
footnote would be necessary, perhaps accompanied 
by some kind of annualization of the rump-year W-
2.  I further recognize that the W-2 simplicity will 
not fully deal with options, parachutes, deferred pay, 
and special pension perks.  Nonetheless, there would 
be tremendous progress in clarity, comprehension, 
and comparability, compared to today’s often obscure 
disclosures.
Submitted by PETER BENOLIEL, with  
which W. BOWMAN CUTTER, JOSH WESTON, 
and HAROLD WILLIAMS have asked to  
be associated.
p. 28.
The oﬃces of the Chief Executive Oﬃcer (CEO) and 
Chair of the Board should be separate and distinct.   
Not having sharp delineation between the two oﬃces 
carries with it too many risks as evidenced in any of 
number of instances over the past 10 years.  While 
“one size does not ﬁt all” the designation of “Lead 
Director” really begs the question.  The Chair should 
be designated as such thus underlining the crucial 
distinction between the two positions.  Preferably, the 
Chair should serve from 2 – 5 years, so as to build and 
maintain a productive working relationship with the 
CEO as well as providing a critical face to shareholders 
and the public.
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CED COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. This 
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assis-
tance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariﬀ barriers to trade.
CE  Circulo de Empresarios
  Madrid, Spain
CEAL  Consejo Empresario de America Latina
  Buenos Aires, Argentina
CEDA  Committee for Economic Development of Australia
  Sydney, Australia
CIRD  China Institute for Reform and Development
  Hainan, People’s Republic of China
EVA  Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
  Helsinki, Finland
FAE  Forum de Administradores de Empresas
  Lisbon, Portugal
IDEP  Institut de l’Entreprise
  Paris, France
IW  Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Koeln
  Cologne, Germany
 Keizai Doyukai
  Tokyo, Japan
SMO  Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming 
  The Netherlands
SNS  Studieförbundet Naringsliv och Samhälle
  Stockholm, Sweden


